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NOTES
APPLICABILITY OF THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW IN THE LOCAL
NAVIGABLE WATERS OF PUERTO Rico

Introduction
The constitutional requirement of uniformity in the maritime
law, a doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the now famous
case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,' established that state legislation or state court decisions may not substantially alter the characteristic features of the general maritime law.2 The occasion for
this historic pronouncement was an attempt by the State of New
York to apply its local compensation act to a longshoreman 3 injured
and killed while unloading a ship on navigable waters and berthed
at a New York pier. Characterizing the action as one of maritime
cognizance, the Supreme Court declaried the application unconstitutional, stating that:
[N]o such [state] legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose
expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the char-

244 U.S. 205 (1917).

2The

general maritime law provides the seaman with .maintenance and
cure, as well as full wages for the length of the voyage, if he becomes sick
or injured while in the service of his ship. In addition the doctrine of unseaworthiness entitles him to an indenmity-for injuries received as a consequence of some defective condition of the ship or its appurtenances. See
In 1920 Congress added the Jones
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958), to the general maritime
law. The Jones Act provides..that "Any seaman who shall suffer personal
injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action
for .damages -at law,. with the right of trial by jury, anc..in, such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the cdmmon-law right or
remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply...."
The effect of the Jones Act
41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
was to enable a seaman to maintain an action for personal injuries at law
or in admiralty, Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), and to
make unavailable to his employer the affirmative defenses of assumption of
risk, the fellow servant rule or contributory negligence. See Brown v. C. D.
Mallory & Co., 122 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1941).
3 In 1926, the Supreme Court held that a longshoreman was entitled to
sue under the Jones Act. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S.
50 (1926). But the Longshoremen's and -Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1958), subsequently passed by
Congress provided an exclusive remedy against the employer. See GrLMoRE &
BLACK, ADmIuzALTY 251 (1957).
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acteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper
harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations. 4

The doctrine of uniformity has since become firmly entrenched and
the work of the courts in this area has largely been a matter of determining whether state legislation has in fact interfered with the
required uniformity, since the states, despite the doctrine, retain some
power to legislate concerning maritime matters.;
Recently, however, the First Circuit has upheld the application
of the Puerto Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act 6 to
Puerto Rican-employed seamen injured on the local navigable waters
of the island. 7 The decision admittedly creates an area of lack of
uniformity in the maritime law,8 but the court justified this seeming
violation of the constitutional requirement on the ground that Puerto
Rico as a commonweath was not subject to the same constitutional
restrictions as the states.9 It is the purpose of this note to determine
the significance of the Jensen doctrine in the context of Puerto Rican
waters.
Historical Prelude to Uniformity
The Constitution extends the judicial -power to "all Cases of

admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."."

In the judiciary Act of

1789, Congress vested this exclusive admiralty jurisdiction originally
in what are now the federal district courts, but saved to suitors in

all cases the right of a common-law remedy when the common law
was competent to give it."

Consequently, it early became settled

4 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).

5 bid. See also Grant Smith-Porter Co, v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922y;
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 11 § 1 (1955).
Flores v. Prann, 282"F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 29 -U.S.L:
This decision has no doubt caused a
WaEK 3284 (U.S. March 27, 1961).
good deal of consternation in admiralty circles, since its practical effect- is to
deprive injured seamen, whose employers are covered by the Puerto Rico
Workmen's Accident Compensation Act, of the broad recovery available under
the general maritime law and the appihdaged Jon 's Act, and to siubstitute
the more limited recovery of the workmen's compensation act. See Freeinan,
Recent Trends in the Controversy Over the Extensiom of Workmen's Compensation into Maritime and Railroad Fields, 4 NACCA L.J. 229, 230-33
(1949).
The Puerto Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act provides
that: "When an employer insures his workmen or employees in accordance
with this chapter, the right herein established to obtain compensation shall be
the only remedy against the employer ... !" P.R. LAws AiNN. tit. 11, § 21
(1955).
(Emphasis added.)
8 Flores v. Prann, 282 F.2d 153, 157 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 29 U.S.
L. WEEK 3284 (U.S. March 27, 1961).
9
Id.at 155.
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
"11 Stat 77 (1789) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958)).
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that the federal courts sitting in admiralty had exclusive power to
hear maritime actions in rem,' 2 whereas a concurrent jurisdiction
existed at law in the federal and state courts to hear maritime actions
in personam.' 3 Throughout the nineteenth century these jurisdictional divisions had substantive as well as procedural overtones,
due to the fact that the maritime law and the common law were
considered as two separate and distinct bodies of law, each supreme
in its own forum. 14 Hence a federal district court sitting in admiralty
was presumed to look to the maritime law as the source of its
substantive rules, whereas the same court hearing a maritime action
on the law side, as well as a state court, was presumed to draw
upon the common law for its substantive rules. As a concrete
example, a federal district court sitting in admiralty would apply
the admiralty rule of divided damages to a maritime tort case involving negligence by both parties,'" but the same court hearing the
action on its law side and the state courts would apply the common
law rule of contributory negligence.' 6
This dual conceptualism engendered problems, for if state courts
hearing maritime actions in personam drew on the common law for
their substantive rules, then it would seem to follow that it was
within the power of the states to change, alter or modify that law
by legislation or judicial decision. Indeed the dissenting opinion
of Justice Holmes in the lensen case argued that the "saving to
suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act clearly recognized the existence
of such a power:
It might be asked why, if the grant of jurisdiction to the courts of the
United States imports a power in Congress to legislate, the saving of a
common-law remedy, i.e., in the
state courts, did not import a like if sub1
ordinate power in the States.

Even a brief glimpse at Supreme Court history bears out the proposition that to some extent the states have a power to add to the body

of substantive rules applicable to maritime actions. Where the
maritime law prescribed no remedy state statutes had been permitted
to fill the gaps. Thus, a state statute providing an in rem lien upon
12 The Glide, 167 U.S. 606 (1897) ; The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
411 (1866) ; Slocum v. Mayberry, 4 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817).
13 Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U.S. 118 (1880); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 185 (1870).
14 See Palfrey, The Common Law Courts and the Law of the Sea, 36
HRAuv. L. REv. 777, 779 (1923).
15 The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1890) ; See also The "Sunnyside,"
91 U.S. (1 Otto) 208, 216 (1875); The Continental, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 345
(1871).
16 Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893); Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 389, 395 (1874).
17 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 223 (1917)
(dissenting
opinion).
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a domestic vessel for repairs in her home port was upheld, though
the proceeding being in rem was confined to a federal district court.18
Likewise, it was held that a state statute fixing pilotage fees 9 and
a state statute giving damages for death caused by tort 20 could create
rights enforceable in the federal courts. But where the maritime law
had spoken, state legislation was declared invalid. Hence a state
statute creating an in rem lien upon a foreign vessel was declared
an unconstitutional interference with the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, since the maritime law provided such a
remedy. 2
Similarly state attempts to authorize in rem admiralty
proceedings in state courts were declared unconstitutional infringements of the exclusive federal jurisdiction.? The majority opinion in
the Jeosen case acknowledged that to some extent the states had
power to legislate in maritime matters, but it drew the line at legislation which would disrupt the uniformity and harmony of the maritime
law or destroy its essential characteristics.2 s However, the decision of
the First Circuit in Flores v. Prann2 4 has precluded the operation
of the Jensen doctrine in Puerto Rico, and thus recognized a power
to legislate in maritime matters in that commonwealth, greater than
that which resides in the states.
Uniformity as a Constitutional Concept
The lensen case shattered the nineteenth century notion of
two systems of law supreme in their respective forums, and substituted for it the "doctrine of the supremacy of admiralty over the
common law." 25 The theory was that the constitutional extension
of the judicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," imported the adoption of a federal maritime law coextensive with that jurisdiction, 26 and bound the federal courts in
the exercise of the judicial power, as well as the state courts, to draw
from this common source so as to effect a uniform maritime policy.

28The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874); Peyroux v. Howard
& Varion, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324 (1833).
'9Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1871) ; Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
20 The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
2
1 The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903).
22 The Glide, 167 U.S. 606 (1897).
23 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra note 17, at 216.
24 282 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 29 U.S.L. WE&K 3284 (U.S.
March 27, 1961).
25 See Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty Over the
Common Law, 21 CoLum. L. RFv. 647 (1921).
26 The majority opinion in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917), quoted with approval the following statement by the Supreme Court
in The Lottawanna: "That we have a maritime law of our own, operative
throughout the United States, cannot be doubted. The general system of
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From this premise it followed that if the federal maritime law
prescribed rights in a particular area, any inconsistent state-created
rights in the same area would destroy the desired uniformity and
amount to an unconstitutional invasion of the paramount federal
judicial power.2 7 In certain respects the doctrine rang true with
past history. State-created liens against domestic vessels operated
locally in an area where federal law had not spoken, and were
enforced in federal courts. 28 On the other hand state-created liens
against foreign vessels invaded an area in which the federal law
already existed, and were declared unconstitutional infringements of
the exclusive federal jurisdiction. 29 Viewed in this respect the same
thing was true in Jensen, since the state compensation commission
had attempted to provide a remedy inconsistent with that which the
federal maritime law as interpreted by the federal courts was competent to provide. 30
The dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes 31 and Pitney 3 2 in
Jensen acknowledged the diverse sources of the maritime law, apparently adopting the theory prevalent in the nineteenth century, and
denied the existence of a federal maritime law, at least as a single
corpus juris adopted by the Constitution. Both opinions refer to
instances of state-created rights enforceable in federal courts as
testamentary of the diverse origins of our maritime law. However,
as already mentioned, these cases would seem to be distinguishable,
though perhaps not wholly satisfactorily, on the ground that the
states were then acting locally in areas where federal law had prescribed no remedies, and the statutes if adopted would create no
area of lack of uniformity.
maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country
when the Constitution was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred
to when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United
States shall extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction! . . .
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to
a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole
country." Id. at 215.
27 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1917).
See also
Dodd, supra note 25: "It appears to be Mr. Justice McReynold's view
[writing for the majority in Jensen] . . . that entirely apart from any implied
power of legislation in Congress the federal courts have, under the sanction
of the Constitution, in some mysterious manner established a federal code of
admiralty law which is not to be impaired either by state courts or state
legislatures. According to his view of the matter it is the judicial power of
the court rather than the legislative power of Congress which is interfered
with by the statute in question." Id. at 656.
28 See cases cited, note 18 supra.
29 The Roanoke, supra note 21.
30 See note 2 supra. Although the Jones Act recovery was not available
in 1917, the general maritime law remedies as described by the Supreme
Court in The Osceola were applicable.
31 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
32 Id. at 226 (dissenting opinion).
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Regardless of the merits of the Jensen case, the fact remains
that the doctrine was adopted. A subsequent congressional attempt
to avoid the result achieved in Jensen by amending the "saving to
suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act so as to preserve "to claimants
the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of
any state," 33 was declared unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart.34 The Court recognized that the amendment was an
attempt to circumvent the Jensen decision,35 and stated that Congress, when exercising its paramount legislative power in the maritime
area, had to do so uniformly.3 6 The obvious effect of the amendment
was to sanction the diverse compensation laws of the several states,
and thus to permit an invasion of the federal judicial power by the
states.3 7 A similar but more limited amendment designed to effect
the same
results was struck down in Washington v. W. C. Dawson
& Co. 8 on the same grounds. There the Court reaffirmed the

decisions in Jensen and Knickerbocker in the following words:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law
by statutes of general application. .. . This power, we think, would permit
enactment of a general employers' liability law or general provisions for
compensating injured employees;[39] but it may not be delegated to the
several States. The grant of admiralty and naritime jurisdiction looks to
uniformity; otherwise wide discretion is left to Congress.40

33 40 Stat. 395 (1917).

34253 U.S. 149 (1920).
35
Id. at 163.
36
Id. at 160. The Court made the following statement: "To preserve
adequate harmony and appropriate uniform rules relating to maritime matters
and bring them within control of the Federal Government was the fundamental
purpose (of the constitutional grant of judicial power) ; and to smch definite
end3 Congress was empowered to legislate. . .

."

Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

7Id. at 163. "[We conclude that Congress undertook to permit application of Workmen's Compensation Laws of the several States to injuries
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. . .

."

Ibid. See also Dodd,

The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Adntiralty Over the Common Law,
21 CoLum. L. REv. 647 (1921) : "The remaining case, that of Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, is important . . . mainly as reemphasizing the doctrine
of the Jensen case that it is the judicial power conferred upon the federal
courts by the admiralty clause rather than the legislative power impliedly
conferred upon Congress that makes such state laws as the New York Workmen's Compensation Act invalid." Id. at 663.
39s264 U.S. 219 (1924).
This dictum remark would seem to indicate that Congress could constitutionally alter even those parts of the general maritime law that' were
impliedly adopted by the Constitution, provided it did so uniformly. But
Congress apparently could not withdraw the rights available under the general
mairtime law from a particular area, leaving local legislation to operate in its
stead, while at the same time allowing the maritime law to prevail in the
other areas under the federal jurisdiction.
40Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1924).
(Emphasis added.)
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Nevertheless, on the assumption that the constitutional requirement
of uniformity did not apply to Puerto Rico, the First Circuit in
Flores v. Prann41 decided that a congressional grant of control over
local navigable waters 42 sanctioned the application 3of the island's
compensation act to seamen injured on local waters.4
The plain import of the decisions involving the states seems
to be that the constitutional extension of the judicial power to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction presumed the adoption
of a federal maritime law, to which the state and federal courts
were bound to look as the source of their substantive law. The
constitutional grant was also viewed as the vehicle by which the
original framers of the Constitution sought to effect a uniform maritime policy. Therefore, to the extent that states created rights
inconsistent with already existing federal rights, they unconstitutionally destroyed the desired uniformity and invaded the judicial power
of the federal courts. Recently, Mr. Justice Frankfurter summarized
the concept of uniformity as follows:
Article III impliedly contained three grants. (1) It empowered Congress to

confer admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on the "Tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court" . . . (2) It empowered the federal courts in their exercise
of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them,
to draw on the substantive law "inherent in the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" . . . and to continue the development of this law within constitutional limits. (3) It empowered Congress to revise and supplement the
maritime law within the limits of the Constitution.44

It remains to be inquired, therefore, whether the unique commonwealth status of Puerto Rico can overcome the uniformity requirements of the Constitution.
Should the Status of Puerto Rico Preclude the Operation
of the Jensen Doctrine?
During the first half of the twentieth century the political status
of Puerto Rico has evolved from that of a conquered territory ceded
41282 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3284 (U.S.

March 27, 1961).

42 In the second organic act for the island Congress provided:
"That the
harbor areas and navigable streams and bodies of water and submerged lands
underlying the same in and around the island of Porto Rico and the adjacent
islands and waters . . . be, and the same are hereby, placed under the control
of the government of Porto Rico ... " 39 Stat. 954 (1917), 48 U.S.C. § 749
(1958).
-3 See Flores v. Prann, 282 F.2d 153, 157 (1st Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
29 U.S.L. WE=K 3284 (U.S. March 27, 1961). "Our problem is ... not one
of constitutional limitations. It is one of statutory interpretation." Id. at 156.
(Emphasis added.)
44 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61
(1959). (Emphasis added.)
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by a peace treaty 45 to that of a commonwealth freely associated
with the United States.46 This very unique commonwealth status
is without parallel in the American union; and, needless to say,
the relationship of the island to the mainland presents problems which
in many ways are not completely analogous to the federal-state
relationship. Nevertheless, the island, although not in fact47 a state,
has been treated as comparable to a state for some purposes.
But the issue within the framework of the present discussion
is whether the Constitution applies to Puerto Rico as it does to the
states. That this question should even arise is initially not easy
to comprehend, and bears some explanation. With the acquisition
of Puerto Rico this country was faced with a unique and difficult
problem. The island and its people were the products of a totally
different culture. Their language, customs, heritage and institutions
had been largely molded by Spain and the Spanish Civil Code.
Hence, if the Constitution with its common-law tradition were immediately and totally imposed upon the island the effect would be
to compel the people to operate under an alien system which they
could not possibly appreciate or understand.
To meet the exigencies of the situation the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of "incorporation" 48 starting with the so-called
Tnsilar cases.4 9 This theory classified the territories as "incorporated" and "unincorporated," the former being considered as future
states to which the entire Constitution extended ex proprio sigore,
while to the latter were extended only certain of its provisions. 0
The notion that the Constitution did not extend in its entirety 51to an
unincorporated territory, which Puerto Rico was considered, but
4sThe island of Puerto Rico was acquired by the Treaty of Paris, 30
Stat. 1754 (1899), ending the Spanish-American War. See Magruder, The
Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 1 (1953).
Commonwealth
46
In a report to the United Nations concerning the status of Puerto Rico
in the American union, the State Department included a letter from Governor
Munoz of Puerto Rico to the President, which expressed the island's status as
follows: "Puerto Rico became a Commonwealth in free and voluntary association with the United States, and its people have now attained a full
measure of self-government." See 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 584, 588 (1953).
47 See Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1953). See also 15

U. Pi-r. L. REv. 170 (1953).
48 See Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of TerritorialIncorporation,
CoLum. L. REv. 823 (1926).
26 49

DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901).
50 See Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 5 (1955).
5"See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922). See also Coudert,
The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 Corum. L.
REv. 823 (1926), in which the author surmises that incorporation has been
associated with a promise of ultimate statehood. Id. at 834. See also, Magruder,
The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. PxTT. L. REv. 1 (1953):
"Puerto Rico, which has never been incorporated, has moved in a different
direction [from the Philippine Islands]. Its present commonweath status is
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that certain of its provisions operated to restrict Congress in dealing
with that territory, had the dual advantage of permitting Congress
a relatively "free hand" in legislating for a territory not ideally suited
for statehood, while at the same time preserving that reverence for
the Constitution so inherent in the American mind. 52 This very
practical doctrine is attributed to the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice White '3 in Downes v. Bidwell,54 wherein he stated that:
In the case of the territories . . . when a provision of the Constitution is

invoked, the question which arises is not whether the Constitution is operative,
for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable. 55

But the doctrine produced some surprising results. For example,
the constitutional right to trial by jury has been held to apply to
incorporated territories 56 and to the District of Columbia, 57 but not
to unincorporated territories on the ground that it was not so
fundamental a right as to be applicable by operation of the Constitution itself. 8 This latter result was particularly surprising in the
case of Puerto Rico inasmuch as its citizens had become citizens of
Organic
the United States in 1917 by operation of the second
Act.59 Recently, the Supreme Court, in Reid v. Covert,6° held that
the constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights attached to American citizenship, and were not confined to the continental United
States. In discussing the Insular cases the Court stated: "[ N] either
the cases nor their reasoning should be given any further
expansion." 61

Although the Covert opinion levelled some criticism at the
"incorporation" theory, it is by no means clear that its criticism
refers to anything more than the constitutional guarantees in the
Bill of Rights. But regardless of the present status of the "incorporation" theory, it is clear that at least some parts of the Constitution
extend to the territories. Hence, in determining whether Puerto

unprecedented in our American history and has no exact counterpart elsewhere
in the world. Clearly that status precludes neither ultimate statehood nor
ultimate independence." Id. at 5.
52 See Coudert, supra note 51, at 850.
53 Id. at 826.
54 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
55 Id. at 292.
56 See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (Alaska).
57 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
58 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) ; Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138 (1904) (Philippine Islands). Hatchett v. Government of Guam, 212
F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1954).
5939 Stat. 953 (1917). An organic act is an act of Congress conferring
the powers of government upon a territory. See In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 447

(1890).
60354 U.S. 1 (1957).
61 Id. at 14.
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Rico has the power to supplant the general maritime law, the more
immediate question would seem to be whether the constitutional
requirement of a uniform maritime law applies to Puerto Rico as it
does to the states.
Before Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States its maritime
law was prescribed by Book III (entitled "Maritime Commerce")
of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1886.62 Upon cession to the
United States, the navigable waters of Puerto Rico became subject
to the exercise of the sovereign authority of this country. Congress
exercised this authority when in Section 9 of the Foraker Act,63 the
original organic act for the island, it included Puerto Rico within one
of the six great coasting districts of the United States and admitted
the island "to all the benefits of the coasting trade of the United
States." 6 The Act further provided that'the "coasting trade ...
shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of law applicable
" 5 indicating that our domestic shipping laws
to such trade ....
were to be applied in Puerto Rico. In addition the Foraker Act
nationalized all Puerto Rican vessels.6 6 These steps leave little
doubt that the island assumed an immediate role. in the overall
maritime activity of the United States. The Foraker Act also expressly reserved control of the island's local harbor areas and navigable waters to the United States, 67 thus apparently barring the
island from exercising even a limited police power over those waters.
After a careful review of these initial actions, the First Circuit, in
Guerrido v. Alcoa S.S. Co.,68 reached the conclusion that:
[A]Imost from the day of the Spanish cession of Puerto Rico to the
United States it was recognized that the navigable waters of the island were
to be regarded as navigable waters of the United States subject to the federal
jurisdiction.69
70
This same statement was quoted with approval in Flores v. Prann,
and yet on both occasions the First Circuit permitted the local
compensation act to apply, first to longshoremen and finally to seamen. These results are even more surprising in view of the following statement by the First Circuit in Guerrido:

One of the purposes of the establishment by the Constitution of the rules of
the general maritime law as part of the laws of the United States was to

6

2 See Guerrido v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 234 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir. 1956).
6331 Stat. 77 (1900).

64 31 Stat. 79 (1900).
65 Ibid

6 Ibid.
6731 Stat. 80 (1900).

- 234 F.2d 349 (Ist Cir. 1956).

69 Id. at 354.
70282 F.2d 153, 156 (lst Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 29 U.S.L. WE= 3284

(U.S. March 27, 1961).
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preserve harmony and uniformity in maritime matters in both the international and interstate relations of the country. This purpose was best to be
promoted if the rules of maritime law thus established were to be regarded
as applicable and enforceable throughout the whole extent of the navigable
waters over which the United States has authority to exercise jurisdiction,
which after 1899 included the navigable waters of Puerto Rico. 7 1
It is clear, therefore, that the First Circuit recognized that the Constitution established a federal maritime law and sought uniformity
in that law, and also that the navigable waters of Puerto Rico were
navigable waters of the United States and subject to federal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in each instance the Court held that, absent
72
an express extension of the general maritime law to Puerto Rico,
the island might supplant it by local legislation passed in virtue of
73
a grant by Congress of control over local navigable waters.
It is certainly true that acts of Congress have in many cases
been expressly extended to the territories.7 4 Nevertheless, the general maritime law is not an act of Congress, but a part of the Constitution by adoption, and the Constitution requires that law to operate uniformly. If the constitutional requirement of uniformity is to
have any meaning it would certainly seem to extend ex proprio
vigore to the navigable waters of the United States. 75 Even assuming the "incorporation" theory retains any vitality and the applicability of parts of the Constitution to the unincorporated territories requires a provision by provision analysis, it would still seem
to follow that as the navigable waters of Puerto Rico form an
essential part of the navigable waters of the United States, they too
are bound by the constitutional requirement of uniformity. Consequently, the First Circuit would seem to have erred in drawing an
analogy between congressional legislation, which in many instances
is expressly made applicable to territories, and the general maritime
law which extends by the Constitution ex proprio vigore to the nay-

See Guerrido v. Alcoa S.S. Co., supra note 62, at 352. (Emphasis added.)
See Flores v. Prann, 282 F.2d 153, 157 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
29 U.S.L. WEzs 3284 (U.S. March 27, 1961); Guerrido v. Alcoa S.S. Co.,
234 F.2d 349, 355 (1st Cir. 1956).
73 See note 42 supra.
74 See Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F.2d 262 (1st Cir.
1936) : "It has generally been customary for Congress, in extending legislation to the territories and 'possessions' of the United States, to expressly
mention them as included within the purview of the act." Id. at 266.
75 In The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870), the Supreme Court
defined the test of navigable waters as follows: "And they constitute navigable
waters of the United States . . . when they form in their ordinary condition
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries
in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water."
Id. at 563.
71
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igable waters of the 76United States, thereby seemingly including
Puerto Rican waters.
One further point requires discussion. It has already been
indicated that the constitutional extension of the judicial power to
all cases of admiralty jurisdiction, imported the adoption of a federal
maritime law, which the federal courts in the exercise of the judicial
power were bound to apply and which the state courts or legislatures
could not substantially alter. However, the federal district court in
Puerto Rico is not a "constitutional" court created under Article III,
section 2 of the Constitution.77 It is a "legislative" 78 court created
under Article IV, section 3, which grants Congress the power to
"make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States." 79 As such it
does not share in the judicial power of the United States, since it is
"incapable of receiving it." 80 But the mere fact that the federal
district court in Puerto Rico is not exercising the constitutional
judicial power does not mean that the constitutional requirement of
uniformity ceases to apply to Puerto Rico. The constitutional grant
of judicial power imports the adoption of a federal maritime law,
and requires the preservation of uniformity in that law. To be
effective that requirement extends to all navigable waters of the
United States, of which the waters of Puerto Rico are an integral
part. The absence of a federal court exercising the judicial power
of the Constitution in Puerto Rico, should not therefore free the
territorial courts or legislature, or the federal district court, albeit
a "legislative" court, from preserving the uniformity of the maritime
law as it is interpreted by the constitutional courts of the United
States.
It is interesting to note that Congress has provided that the
jurisdiction of the federal district court in Puerto Rico shall be
76
In 1920, Congress enacted the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1958), as an addition to the general maritime law. By its terms
it provides a recovery for "any seaman" injured "in the course of his employment." Ibid. As this addition is "legislation" it might be argued that
absent express extension it does not necessarily apply to Puerto Rico. However, Congress when legislating concerning the maritime law must do so
uniformly through acts of general applicability. Hence, as the constitutional
requirement of uniformity seemingly encompasses the waters of Puerto Rico
any addition by Congress to the maritime law would necessarily have to apply
to that area.
"See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).
78 In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), federally
created territorial courts were deemed "legislative" courts in which the judicial
power of the Constitution was not vested, in view of the fact that the judges
of those courts held office for a term of years, rather than during "good
behavior" as provided in the Constitution. Id. at 545. The district judge in
Puerto Rico has a term of office of eight years, 28 U.S.C. § 134a (Supp.
I,1959).
79 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3.
80
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828).
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defined by the same provisions of the Judicial Code as define the
jurisdiction of the "constitutional" district courts of the United
States.8' In other words, the balance of federal-insular maritime
jurisdiction in Puerto Rico as in the states is defined by Title 28
of the United States Code, Section 1333, which is in effect the
original Judiciary Act of 1789.82 In Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co. s 3 the Supreme Court had the following
to say concerning the rationale behind the allocation of maritime
jurisdiction in the original Judiciary Act:
Here, as is so often true in our federal system, allocations of jurisdiction
have been carefully wrought to correspond to the realities of power and
84
interest and national policy.

The constitutional requirement of uniformity should prevail in Puerto
Rico, and the congressional allocation of federal-insular maritime
jurisdiction is perhaps a congressional acknowledgment of the
"power" realities that exist.
Conclusion
The First Circuit might quite reasonably have interpreted the
congressional grant of control over local waters as the vesting of a
"police" power in the island, comparable to that enjoyed by the
states.8 5 An interpretation that Congress was granting that "police"
power previously reserved to the federal government in the Foraker
Act,80 seems more plausible than a holding which makes the requirement of uniformity inapplicable to Puerto Rico. It has been the
consistent policy of Congress to more closely approximate the status
and power of Puerto Rico to that of the states.8 7 Hence, a del8L Section 41 of the Organic Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 965, defined the jurisdiction of the federal district court of Puerto Rico. In 1948, these jurisdictional provisions were eliminated from section 41 as unnecessary for the

reason that the jurisdiction of that court was considered defined by the same

provisions of the Judicial Code as define the jurisdiction of all federal district

courts. See Miranda v. United States, 255 F.2d 9, 14-15 & n.7 (1st Cir.
1958).
8
2 The Judicial Code provides that: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
8s 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
8
4 Id. at 374-75. (Emphasis added.)
85 The states have rather broad power to enact local regulations for rivers,
harbors, piers, and docks. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
783 (1945).
8631 Stat. 80 (1900).
87 See Magruder, The Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 1 (1953) : "[Tlhe status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is still
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egation of "police" power would be perfectly in line with such a
policy. The broader interpretation actually given the delegation of
control over local waters by the First Circuit would appear to make
the grant unconstitutional.

X
DEFICIENCY COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW

Ordinarily, when an employee, injured in the course of employment, receives reparation outside of the Workmen's Compensation
Law from the party responsible for such injuries, he is entitled to
any deficiency between the amount he received and that to which
he would be entitled as a compensation award.' Exceptions arise,
however, where the circumstances surrounding the collateral recovery preclude the employee, or his dependents in case of death,
from receiving deficiency compensation. One such instance is when
the employee accepts a compromise or settlement of a cause of action
against a third party tortfeasor without first receiving the consent of
the employer or carrier liable for compensation payments.&2 The
theory of a denial of deficiency compensation in such a case is that
the actions of the employee have prejudiced the subrogation rights
of the employer or the carrier against the third party. Deficiency
awards are also denied when an employee successfully terminates an
action against the employer while his right to a compensation award
is uncertain.3 Denial in the latter instance is founded on the premise
that the employee should not be permitted to maintain inconsistent
actions.
It is the purpose of this article to outline the New York statutory provisions and to examine the merits of preventing an injured
employee from receiving deficiency compensation in the situations
mentioned above. Particular concern will be given to those instances
where an injured employee has, by some means outside the compensation law, received a sum less than the injury would have
rated as compensation and seeks to recover the difference.
not the same as that of a State in the Federal Union, though both have in
common complete powers of local self-government. . . . On balance, the
Puerto Ricans justly feel that the status of the island . . . though different
from that of a State of the Union, is one of no less dignity." Id. at 19-20.
I See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
2 See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
3 See text accompanying note 101 infra.

